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ABSTRACT
Globalisation has changed economic realities. First, the competences of MNEs are becoming
increasingly mobile and knowledge-intensive. MNEs thus give more attention to the
availability and quality of the created assets of alternative locations. Second, among
developing countries there are now considerable differences between the 'catching-up'
countries (e.g., NICs) and 'falling behind', less-developed countries (LDCs). These
developments have changed the opportunity sets of both parties. FDI-based development
strategies are now commonplace among LDCs, but there is also increased competition for the
'right' kinds of investment. In general, the balance in bargaining power has shifted in favour of
the MNE, and LDCs increasingly need to provide unique, non-replicable created assets to
maintain a successful FDI-assisted development strategy .3
GLOBALISATION AND NEW REALITIES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE-
DEVELOPING HOST COUNTRY INTERACTION
INTRODUCTION
Fundamental changes in political ideologies and economic systems among a large
number of developing countries have led to dramatic shifts in the way governments of these
countries perceive their interests and those of their constituents. As a result, there are now a
wide variety of attitudes and actions by governments towards MNE activity. This
heterogeneity of responses is not, in itself, surprising, given the different stages of
development, political ideologies, cultural norms, history and institutional infrastructure of
countries. It is, nonetheless, possible to generalise that the relations between national
governments and multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the 1990s, if still uneasy, are more
favourable than they have been for many years (Dunning 1998).
The present thrust towards MNE-friendly attitudes by governments dates back to the
early 1980s, and corresponds to a variety of changes in the world economy which have been
generically (although not always appropriately) described as ‘globalisation’. Economic
globalisation refers to the increasing cross-border interdependence and integration of
production and markets for goods, services and capital. This process leads both to a widening
of the extent and form of international transactions, and to a deepening of the interdependence
between the actions of economic actors located in one country and those located in other
countries (Dunning 1997a). It is perhaps best demonstrated by the huge increases in the
transnational flows of both portfolio and direct investment, and in the number of cross-border
strategic alliances.
1 The role of multinational firms has been central in the growth of these
phenomena.
One of the primary consequences of globalisation has been the growing convergence
of income levels, consumption patterns and institutional structures, both within the
industrialised countries, and between the more advanced developing countries; and also the
increasing significance of their intra-firm trade in goods and services (Fukuyama 1995,
Landes 1998). The two primary determinants of globalisation have been, inter alia, (i) the
rapid introduction and implementation of new technologies, particularly information and
computer technologies (ICTs), and the consequential fall in cross-border communication and
organisational costs; and (ii) the renaissance of democratic capitalism and the liberalisation of
many domestic and international markets.4
Globalisation has influenced both the nature of the location specific (L) advantages of
countries and the ownership specific (O) advantages of firms, and the opportunity sets facing
the governments of the former and the managers of the latter. Inter alia, value-adding
activities have become increasingly knowledge-intensive, not just in high-technology sectors,
but also in low-technology sectors, and even in those sectors that were previously regarded as
labour-intensive. Both sets of institutions have thus adjusted their strategies and policies to the
realities of the new global environment. First, the nature of MNE activity has undergone a
marked shift, as firm-specific intangible assets - especially intellectual capital - have become
more mobile. Second, national governments are now increasingly competing with each other
to attract mobile investment. As the significance of immobile L advantages in influencing the
competitive position of MNEs has increased (Porter 1994, 1996), so too have the bargaining
stakes of the two parties.
However, globalisation has not affected all countries and regions to the same extent or
in the same way. Indeed, it has resulted in a widening in the created assets
2 and income gap
between the industrialised countries and a handful of wealthier developing countries on the
one hand, and the poorer developing countries at the other.  The focus of this paper is on the
latter group of countries which have 'fallen behind'. One of the consequences of the
polarisation of countries is that the bargaining position (and the opportunity costs) of the
national governments of these countries vis-à-vis foreign direct investors varies considerably
between these different groups of countries. For example, different kinds of L and O
advantages are associated with inward MNE activity in (say) Taiwan, compared to
Bangladesh. In addition, the motives, modes and extent of MNE involvement vary
considerably by the stage of economic development (Dunning 1981, Dunning and Narula
1994, 1996, Ozawa, 1995, 1996). Such lacunae need to be examined more closely.
FDI-based industrial development policies are now commonplace among developing
countries. Although there has been a growth in the global FDI flows, there is also increased
competition for certain kinds of foreign capital, particularly those that provide opportunities
for indigenous spillovers of technology and organisational capability. This has led to
locational tournaments, which in certain instances, have led to a dissipation of potential net
benefits from MNE activities, at least in the short and medium term (McIntyre et al 1996,
Mytelka 1996). Moreover, in a global world, competition between core and peripheral
economies for a finite number of discrete (i.e., indivisible) investment projects, will, if the L
advantages are similar, be 'won' by the government with the biggest financial incentives and
subsidies. Developing countries are generally not in a position to win such tournaments. The5
improvement of relatively fixed L advantages is the only feasible means for maintaining a
sustainable FDI assisted development strategy. One important means to do so is by optimising
the intra-country spatial distribution of economic activity, and by encouraging clusters to
attract mobile investment. MNEs, in turn, are also looking for specialised clusters that provide
particular kinds of scarce assets to advance their own competitiveness.
This paper is organised as follows. The following section places this paper in context,
by examining the need and plausibility for different frameworks for different groups of
countries. We then discuss the relationship between the motives of foreign production and the
changes in opportunity costs to both developing host country governments and MNEs. Next,
we proceed to explain how globalisation has influenced O and L advantages. The final section
presents some policy implications and conclusions.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The economic relationship between MNEs and democratic national governments is governed
by a fundamental difference in the objectives of each. The MNE, as with most private
economic entities, desires to maximise the welfare of its owners –wherever they may be
located- while the national government wishes to do the same for the constituents within its
jurisdiction. Although not a zero-sum game - even where the relationship is not
confrontational - the failure to find common ground often results in a sub-optimal outcome for
both parties.  Nonetheless there is a greater alignment in the interests of the two parties than
there used to be. As both countries and firms seek to upgrade their productivity and/or
competitiveness, by and large, the only real disagreements that remain concerns the
distribution of the costs and benefits of inbound FDI - including those of increased
interdependence with the rest of the world. This represents a thorny issue, which to some
degree is determined through negotiations between the two parties, and their relative
opportunity sets.
It is obvious that these issues go well beyond those of economics and business; and
must necessarily include socio-political considerations as well. This is particularly the case
with globalisation, which has increased the vulnerability of hitherto relatively closed
economies to the external shocks and influences from the world economy at large. This has
long been the case for most Triad countries, and is becoming increasingly so for developing
countries. In addition, as Stopford and Strange (1991) well illustrate, firm-government
interaction is also influenced by the dynamics of government-government and firm-firm
relationships.6
It is not our intention here to review the literature pertaining to the shifting political
economy of MNE-government relations: this has been tackled elsewhere
3. In this paper, we
are primarily interested in probing how globalisation has changed the way in which
developing country governments interact with MNEs, as the latter play an increasingly
significant role in their economies. For example, the ratio of inbound FDI flows to gross fixed
capital formation (GFCF) in developing countries increased from 3.2% in 1990 to 8.2% in
1995 (UNCTAD 1997)
 4.
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Several attempts have been made to explain the bargaining relationship between
MNEs and governments, the two most notable being Lecraw and Morrison (1991) and
Rugman and Verbeke (1998)
5. Essentially, the basic concept is that relative bargaining
positions of the two parties are based on the opportunity costs as perceived by the MNEs of
their O advantages, and that of the L advantages offered by the countries in which they are
contemplating an investment; and that of host countries of their L advantages and that of the
O advantages offered by the foreign investors. The primary aspects of the relationship as
proposed by Lecraw and Morrison are laid out in Figure 1. This model is not dynamic, in the
sense that it does not examine the path of the changing opportunity sets of either party. For
example, the liberalisation of markets has had a particularly dramatic effect on most (both
Triad and non-Triad) countries, which have experienced massive deregulation, privatisation
and the reduction of trade and investment barriers over a span of a decade (or less). Nor does
it dwell on a second dynamic: viz, the differences in the opportunity sets of different groups
of countries.
The point we wish to emphasise here is that the development path and economic and
social objectives of a country is, at least in the early stages of its development, strongly
dependent on the specific resources, institutions, economic structure and political ideologies
and social and cultural fabric of countries. The kind of FDI activity they might attract (or wish
to attract), too, are different. Indeed, these two issues are closely related. Globalisation has
made the differences between groups of countries become more rather than less noticeable,
even though, simultaneously they are becoming increasingly interdependent. Our primary
thesis is that the bargaining framework of Lecraw and Morrison needs to be contextualised if
it is to be operationally testable. Although every individual negotiation is a unique event, the
type of investment, and the stage of economic development of the host country do allow us to
generalise that the situation faced by the least developed countries is fundamentally different7
from the catching-up countries such as the newly industrialised countries (NICs). The
opportunity sets faced by the latter group, while similar to the Triad countries (and from
whose perspective the bargaining framework was originally developed), also remains distinct.
We develop our argument regarding the existence of three distinct groups by relating it to the
investment development path (IDP), a framework which postulates that the relationship
between FDI and economic structure of countries can be usefully analysed by categorising
their evolution through five stages (e.g., Dunning 1981, Narula 1996). Our primary interest
throughout this paper will be the developing countries with particular focus of the stage 1 and
2 countries of the IDP that have 'fallen behind'.  Throughout the rest of this paper, references
to 'falling behind' countries, 'least developed' countries and 'stage 1 and 2' countries will be
used interchangeably.
Understanding the heterogeneity of developing countries and its influence on their L
advantages
In Figure 2 we present some bullet points of how the MNE/country bargaining
situation has changed with globalisation and how this has affected different countries.
Developing countries do not represent a homogenous group, and this situation has been
exacerbated by the effects of globalisation. The heterogeneity and uneven growth and
development of countries may be explored from several perspectives. The literature on
economic catch-up and convergence
6, for instance, tends to categorise countries into three
broad groups. The first consists of the wealthy industrialised countries which, over the last
two decades, have experienced a convergence in income levels, consumption patterns and
technological capabilities. The second comprises the more advanced industrialised developing
countries (primarily the Asian NICs), which are catching up and converging with the first
group. The third category is made up of a large number of poorer developing countries, which
far from converging with the first and second group are diverging from them, either because
they have ‘fallen behind’ relative to the first group, or because they have ‘stumbled back’ in
both a relative and absolute sense (Hikino and Amsden 1994). Put another way, the
homogeneity among markets that is usually associated with globalisation has occurred only
partially, and in a very selective way.
*******FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE*******
Similar trends have been noted in the case of FDI. Studies on the relationship between
inward and outward FDI and the economic development of a country suggests five stages of8
development, a brief description of which are given in Table 1. at a micro-level, it is now
axiomatic that different motives underlie FDI, and this is associated with the industrial
restructuring process which also follows a distinct pattern. This relates to the work of Chenery
and associates, and with regards to FDI to the work of Dunning (1981), Dunning and Narula
(1994, 1996), Narula (1993, 1996), Ozawa (1995, 1996) and van Hoesel (1999). Despite FDI
flows to developing countries having grown several-fold over the past two decades, the
relative share to developing countries (if one excludes the petroleum exporting countries)
increased from 13.8% of the world total to 15.2%
7. Table 2 gives details of the changes in the
GDP per capita and inward FDI stock per capita of countries, classified according to the
World Bank income groups. Although this classification is not entirely consistent with the
IDP stages, there is considerable overlap, sufficiently so to illustrate our thesis. This data
confirms recent work (e.g., Narula 1996, Dunning and Narula 1998, Dunning et al 1998) on
the convergence and divergence phenomena in the case of FDI. While the inward FDI stocks
per capita of the low-income and lower-middle income countries has increased by a factor of
3.6 between 1980 and 1995, that of the upper-middle and high income groups has increased
by a factor of about 4.4 over the same period. As a result, the gap between the poorest
countries and the high income countries has increased: the ratio of their average FDI levels
has increased from 259 in 1980 to 308 in 1995 (Table 2). A similar trend is noted for the
lower-middle income group.  The majority of these countries are in stage 1 and stage 2. In
addition, they have diverged as a group away from the industrialised countries (stage 4 and 5:
high-income countries in Table 2) with only a handful of countries at stage 3 (upper-middle
income countries in Table 2) experiencing convergence and catch-up, both in terms of income
levels and FDI stocks.
*******TABLE 1&2 ABOUT HERE*******
With the increasing reliance of less developed countries on FDI as a source of capital,
technology and knowledge (UNCTAD 1997), there is increasing likelihood that there will be
further polarisation of the world economy and widening of the gap between the Triad and the
bulk of developing countries. In addition, despite the fact that the role of MNEs in some of the
stage 1 and 2 countries is increasing - notably in South East Asia (Mason 1998) -
opportunities for sequential investments are limited, especially in higher value added
activities and sectors which provide the most significant potential spillovers (Blomstrom
1989). In an analysis of the effects of global integration on development, Gray (1996) predicts
that as globalisation proceeds, the marginal net benefits derived by the least developed9
countries from international involvement will decline. He suggests that the costs of
marginalisation are self-reinforcing in that the inability of these countries to attract the kinds
of inward FDI which result in positive spillover effects, is also accompanied by fewer
opportunities for exports and inflows of portfolio capital.
It is important to note that the IDP framework is used here only as a general paradigm
within which to understand the linkage between motives, kinds of FDI and the economic
structures of countries; and, in consequence, the difference in the bargaining positions of
countries. Essentially, globalisation has made many of the L advantages of countries and the
O advantages of firms increasingly knowledge-intensive. Some of these advantages have
become more mobile, others less so. Moreover, it would seem that these same advantages
have become more interdependent of each other. For example, a firm's O advantages in time
t+1 may be dependent on the locational profile of its assets in time t, while a country's L
advantages in time t+1 may be influenced by its ability to attract the O advantages of foreign
firms in time t. While it is true that there is considerable variation in a country's international
investment position between countries at the same stage of development, depending on their
economic and political systems, and resource endowments, there are broad similarities that
allow us to generalise.
It is to be noted, nonetheless, that these development stages may overlap, precisely
because of the various economic and industrial policy options selected. Industrial policy
where certain industries are selected for rapid growth by focused investments through
intensive development of created assets can and do accelerate the movement of countries
through the IDP (van Hoesel 1999). The examples of both the more advanced industrialised
countries (such as the NICs) and the second tier emerging economies, particularly Malaysia
and Brazil illustrate this. Attracting specialised FDI to a particular sector can alter the
sequence of industrial upgrading (Williamson and Hu 1994), because specialised FDI may
help improve the created assets associated within a sector (say consumer electronics
production). Created assets in this one sector may have significant knowledge flows
externalities in another (say micro-electronics design), which in turn may represent significant
input to another sector (say software development). But this assumes the presence of a
virtuous circle, and the development of appropriate clusters.
We accept, of course, that inbound FDI does not always play a decisive role in this
process of industrial upgrading, or the development of clusters. Clusters may develop without
significant MNE intervention, as illustrated by the case of Korea where its large domestic
conglomerates have acted as the main engine of growth. Similarly, in Sialkot Pakistan,10
clusters of small firms have developed with world-class expertise in the absence of FDI-based
knowledge inflows; they which supply 10-15% of the world market for high quality surgical
instruments, and 50% of the market in low quality clinical instruments (Nadvi 1996
8)
However, although inward FDI does not represent the only option available to
developing countries, but given their urgency and limited resources it may represent the most
efficient option. This is for at least four reasons. First, the costs of acquiring technological and
organisational know-how through arms-length means is an expensive undertaking, and given
the shortage of capital this option is not open to many developing country governments with
limited resources. Second, liberalised markets means that firms, ceteris paribus, are likely to
be more eager to maintain control of their assets and internalise the market for themselves,
either through wholly owned subsidiary or in a joint venture. Exceptions exist, but only where
either some strategic reason for the MNE allow for this, the host country has a strong
bargaining position
9, or where the technology has reached the status of a commodity. Third,
infant industry protection is de rigeur in creating a domestic sector from scratch, and protected
markets are a limited option within the framework of WTO. Fourth, the resources,
complementary clusters and assets necessary to support a viable and strong domestic sector
are also capital and knowledge intensive. The role of competition in fostering viable domestic
industry is a especially important point. This is best illustrated by the failure of the import-
substituting programme in a large number of countries to achieve just this objective.
We wish to emphasise that the availability of foreign-owned capital (either portfolio or
direct) for developing countries, is not at issue here. There have been capital flows of both
kinds to viable projects in the less developed countries, particularly in extractive industries,
and through privatisation programmes. In addition, there has been some low value-adding,
labour intensive activities such as garment assembly, which come from attempts to
circumvent the multi-fibre agreement. Nonetheless, these activities do not, in general, provide
much opportunity for technological spillovers and beneficial externalities.  In other words, it
is not FDI activities that are hard to attract, but certain kinds of FDI. The next section
discusses this assertion some detail.
FDI, MOTIVES AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS
It is generally acknowledged that there are four main motives for investment: to seek
natural resources; to seek new markets; to restructure existing foreign production through
rationalisation, and to seek strategically related created assets. These in turn can be broadly
divided into two types. The first three represent motives which are primarily asset-exploiting11
in nature: that is, the investing company's primary purpose is to generate economic rent
through the use of its existing firm-specific assets. The last is a case of asset-augmenting
activity, whereby the firm wishes to acquire additional assets which protect or augment their
existing created assets in some way.
Table 1 suggests that due to their lack of indigenous created assets, countries in stages
1 and 2 of their IDP are unlikely to attract much asset-augmenting FDI. Such investment is
primarily an activity undertaken in stage 4 and 5 countries, and to a lesser extent, stage 3
countries. While there has been an increase in the location of asset-augmentation activity in
some developing countries during the last decade, this continues to be the exception rather
than the rule. This is simply because the human resources, technological capabilities and
organisational skills that these countries (or their firms) possess, tend to be in relatively low-
technology and natural resource intensive sectors which have become 'generic' over time
(Dunning et al 1998). Indeed, it is often the case that developing country MNEs locate
subsidiaries in major clusters of activity in locations in stage 4 and 5, in order to augment
their own O advantages. In the case of strategic technology partnering, an important means by
which asset-augmentation is undertaken, Freeman and Hagedoorn (1994) and Narula and
Sadowski (1998) both show that with the exception of a few developing countries in stage 3
of their IDP -notably the Asian NICs and China - relatively little technology partnering
involves developing country firms. MNE activities in stage 1 and stage 2 countries tend to be
in asset-exploiting activity, and as such, asset-augmenting FDI tends (with a few exceptions)
to be rare. There are exceptions to this generalisation, for instance, where a MNE has
established a location as a regional centre (such as Unilever’s use of Thailand as a specialist
regional R&D centre for personal products) or in rare cases, where immobile L advantages is
in the form of a cluster of highly skilled but relatively inexpensive labour that helps
complement the intellectual capital and markets of MNEs, as in the case of Bangalore in India
for the design of software.
Resource seeking FDI
For many years, such investment has been directed to serving international markets.
Resource seeking FDI is a case where created asset type L advantages do not play a
significant role in determining FDI inflows. Simply put, where a region or country possesses
an absolute advantage in a given scarce resource, the government of that location is in a
strong bargaining position. Where the resource sought is a natural one, the marginal cost of its
extraction to both parties is close to zero. As such, the location is able to generate economic
rent depending on the resource's rarity and accessibility in other locations. Most other12
resources, where the advantage is a comparative one, do not maintain a steadily low marginal
cost to governments. The cost of utilising such resources rises relative to other locations as
country moves along its IDP. Thus they do not attract inward FDI with the same interest at all
stages of the IDP. The case of unskilled labour is one example. The location of labour
intensive production becomes steadily less attractive to an MNE as the costs of this input rise,
particularly so where productivity improvements fail to match wage cost increases. The
leverage in such cases lies increasingly with the MNE, as cross-market liberalisation may
enable numerous other locations in several countries to offer similar ‘generic’ and (easily)
replicable L advantages (McIntyre et al 1996).
Its international nature means that, as far as resource seeking FDI per se is concerned,
there is relatively little difference in the bargaining positions between developing and
developed countries. However, since resource-seeking investment generally (but not always)
implies low-value adding activity and low capital expenditure on plant and equipment
(extractive industries being the exception), FDI is less ‘sticky’, i.e., more footloose. In
general, a purely resource-seeking investment is not normally tightly integrated into the
investing firm’s organisational structure: indeed MNEs rarely engage in complete
internalisation of raw material markets; they prefer instead to conclude non-equity agreements
with foreign firms, or purchase their inputs at arms-length prices.
In general, FDI in stage 1 countries is often almost entirely resource seeking. Since
there are few other L advantages to offer MNEs, this is often the only kind of FDI present.
Where vertical forward integration and further value adding does occur (perhaps because of
developments in L advantages as the country moves to stage 2), either to exploit markets or to
access other L advantages, the ‘stickiness’ of the investment increases, thereby strengthening
the bargaining position of the host government. Both market-seeking and efficiency seeking
investment imply higher integration within the MNE, and a higher level of commitment as
well as a higher degree of embedment.
Market-seeking FDI
Market seeking FDI only gains prominence in situations where the local or adjacent
markets provide access to significant opportunities to achieve production economies of scale,
a situation most often experienced in the latter part of stage 1 and from stage 2 onwards. This
requires not only a sizeable population, but also the ability of the market to support (within a
reasonable time frame) the expected demand on which the investment is based. In addition
though, there is often a ‘follow-the-leader’ strategic response by other firms, whereby a
market that might have supported two or three competitors is inundated with a larger number13
of new entrants than the market can efficiently support. The case of both the Chinese and the
Indian automobile market represent examples of such a scenario, where despite the potential
for high demand levels, few participants are actually able to make a profit. This is not the case
with all sectors – investments in food and personal products for instance are much more likely
to achieve economies of scale, since these products have a relatively low income elasticity of
demand. Indeed, the automobile industry may represent a special case in these countries, for
what is now described as aggressive market-seeking investments in developing countries in
many cases began life as defensive import-substituting investments. These were only
permitted under certain stringent conditions, but the MNE normally expected to have access
to a captive protected market in return.
Market seeking FDI, by it nature, is based on a single central L advantage. Its presence
or absence is stage-dependent, but is essentially an exogenous event, with one exception.
Membership of a free trade area allows countries that have small domestic markets to expand
their de facto market size.  In such situations, however, several formerly sovereign markets
become integrated, and the choice of location then rests on other L advantages.  This may
have detrimental effects too: once sanctions against South Africa were lifted, a certain
hollowing out of market seeking FDI in neighbouring countries was observed, as a result of
their free trade agreements with South Africa.
Efficiency seeking and strategic asset-seeking FDI
These two types of investment are similar in that they both normally require a certain
threshold level of created assets, and are generally regarded as being associated with the
process of globalisation. It is no surprise that they are generally associated with countries at
the latter end of stage 2 onwards, but, especially in the case of asset-seeking FDI, with the
industrialised countries.
As such, efficiency seeking investment in the least developed countries is an
ambiguous concept, although, for many years, MNEs have engaged in export-oriented
resource-seeking investment, which is de facto efficiency-seeking FDI. Moreover, efficiency
investment - in the sense that different aspects of manufacturing activity are located in
particular locations to exploit the economies of cross-border specialisation and the uneven
distribution of immobile created assets- is a relatively new phenomenon
In both of these types of investments, the role of sub-national clusters and the
agglomeration of related activities is significant. The bargaining positions of countries that are
home to centres of agglomeration, or indeed, possess the necessary science and technology
infrastructure necessary to attract asset-augmenting FDI, are considerably different from14
countries which primarily attract asset-exploiting FDI. It is to be noted that even where
centres of excellence or agglomeration exist in a given industry, this does not imply that
further knowledge intensive investments will be attracted to the same location by virtue of a
single cluster existing, unless clear spillovers or externalities exist. Nonetheless, countries (or
regions within countries) that have (the basis for) agglomerative economies are the ones likely
to be in a strong bargaining position. This was originally the case for export processing zones
(EPZs). It now applies to higher value adding activities – even in stage 2 countries such as
India- but only where such L advantages are perceived by MNEs to efficiently complement
their own core competences.
HOW GLOBALISATION AFFECTS O AND L ADVANTAGES
In developing a clear understanding of the changes deriving from globalisation per se, it is
necessary for us to highlight how the phenomenon has affected the L advantages of countries
(both developing and industrialised), and the nature of the opportunity sets available to
developing countries in general. At the same time, these same forces have influenced the
nature of the O advantages of firms and their need and willingness to internalise the markets
for them.  To some extent, at least, the adoption of outward-looking, export-oriented policy
stances by developing countries has been inspired by the success of relatively rapid
industrialisation by the Asian NICs. However, the circumstances under which these countries
achieved their rapid growth are closely related to the geo-political and economic situation of
the post WW2 era. These circumstances cannot be easily replicated in this age of globalisation
and the current international political economy.
Underlying the shift in the bargaining power of national governments vis-à-vis foreign
MNEs, are two inter-related phenomena. First, there has been a significant reconfiguration in
the way both MNEs conduct and coordinate their international operations.  Second, there has
been a fundamental change in the nature and type of location-specific assets of host countries
which MNEs are interested in accessing. Not coincidentally, these changes are directly
associated with the economic changes associated with globalisation, and especially with the
introduction and adoption of new technologies as well as the renaissance of market-based
capitalism.
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Table 3 and 4 summarise how these changes in the world economic environment are
likely to have influenced the opportunity sets facing both MNEs and governments.  However,
as we have already emphasised, the heterogeneity of developing countries implies that the
general picture set out in these tables disguises certain rather important nuances pertaining to
the changes in the nature of opportunity costs that have special reference to the least
developed country governments.
New Technologies
The growth of new technologies has had a significant impact on the locational preferences of
MNEs. While technological breakthroughs have been rife, not all have the same direct
causality with globalisation as information and communications technologies (ICTs) are
considered to do, but are nonetheless associated with it. Of particular note are developments
in the fields of new materials, biotechnology, aerospace technologies optical technologies.
ICTs
10 in particular have dramatically shrunk the economic distance between nation states,
and have fostered a series of generic productivity improvements. We outline below how new
technologies have influenced the competitive advantages of firms and countries.
(a) New technologies and the O advantages of firms.
Table 3 presents some of the primary effects of new technologies on the O advantages of
firms. In particular, we would highlight two main issues:
(i) Improved coordination of intra-firm and inter-firm activities. It is a fundamental feature of
international production that cross-border market failure exists in the supply of intermediate
goods and services, and especially intangible assets. New advances in ICTs have reduced the
cost of acquiring and disseminating knowledge and information in two main ways. First,
information about both input and output markets is more easily accessible. This allows firms
which previously could not engage in international business transactions to do so
11. Second,
MNEs are better able to integrate the activities of their foreign affiliates through the use of
these technologies, and to more quickly respond to changing demand and supply conditions in
the countries in which they operate. Taken together, these transaction cost-reducing processes
are enabling international production to be more efficiently organised across borders. They
are also prompting more rationalised and strategic asset-seeking value-added investment
activity by MNEs.
While these new economies of common governance are of particular references to
integrated MNEs, multi-domestic MNEs are also able to utilise regional similarities and16
develop ‘hub and spoke’ approaches, and exploit scale and scope economies between and
within regions (Buckley and Casson 1998).  Such options allow firms to hedge investments,
but are only possible as a result of the reduced monitoring costs associated with ICTs.
There have also been substantial cost-savings in the coordination and monitoring costs
associated with inter-firm networks.  This growing use of networks, both intra- and inter-firm,
is one of the primary features of the age of alliance capitalism (Dunning 1995). The number
of strategic alliances, joint ventures, R&D consortia and the like has experienced rapid
growth, both within and between countries (Hagedoorn and Narula 1996), but mainly among
the Triad countries. One of the main advantages of improved intra- and inter-firm
coordination, is the ease with which MNEs are able to respond to changes in demand and
supply. In general, this has meant that firms pursuing multi-domestic strategies can now
practice a policy of regional rationalisation, which, in principle, should benefit both the
participating countries and the MNE.
(ii) Rapidity of innovation in new technologies has led to truncated product life cycles as new
or modified products are more rapidly innovated and manufactured. Firms need both to be
able to undertake technological developments and to bring them to market much more
speedily than was previously the case. Computer-aided design, ‘flexible’ manufacturing
systems and computer-aided manufacturing have further reduced the set-up costs and time
taken to bring to market a new product. Although this has led to a reduction in fixed costs,
these technologies are not costless. Shortened product life cycles, for example, often require a
relatively high R&D intensity if firms are to remain competitive. They also suggest that
innovating firms need to recoup these fixed costs, before their technology becomes
redundant,
12 often by expanding its overseas markets. Once again, target markets tend to be
the industrialising and industrial economies, rather than the diverging developing countries,
where multi-domestic strategies still prevail, and whose markets tend to receive products for
which the R&D costs have already been amortised.
b. New technologies and the L advantages of countries
Table 4 discusses the effects of new technologies on the L advantages of countries. Our
objective here is to focus on the special case of the developing countries, and we highlight
some of these differences here.
One of the primary means by which the L advantages have been affected by new
technologies has been the emergence and development of entirely new industries, which have
generated new sources of employment. The extent to which these developments have affected17
the ability of developing country firms to catch-up is not as acute as with more established
sectors. This because in fundamentally new technologies there is not likely to be as large a
‘gap’ between the lead and lag countries. Indeed, some stage 2 countries - as have most of the
stage 3 countries - have successfully engaged in a ‘niche’ strategy by specialising in the
production of very specific new technologies as a way of upgrading their competitiveness -
the often cited example of India’s burgeoning software sector and the focus of other nations
(e.g., Cuba) in biotechnology is another (Acharya 1995). However, the failure of the majority
of developing countries to exploit these new technologies has acted as a centripetal force, and
has encouraged the centralisation of production by MNEs.  It should be noted, however, that
the opportunity costs of national governments in pursuing a competence in new technologies
are quite high, both in terms of creating the necessary infrastructure- including clusters of
related activities- and sustaining the necessary macro-organizational policies and financial
incentives over an extended period of time. In the main then, the smaller and/or poorer
developing countries cannot afford to invest in several niches simultaneously, and as such the
question of technological forecasting (i.e., picking the 'right' sectors) becomes crucial.
The relatively low costs to entry are not uniform for all new technologies, however.
Most sub-sectors of ICTs, for instance, are highly capital intensive, and are built on existing
technologies that are well established and highly competitive. The failure of countries such as
Korea in entering and maintaining a strong position memory chips, or Taiwan's Acer in
achieving a competitive position in the personal computer industry illustrate this well (Ernst
1998).
Indeed, these types of sectors are the sort of industries where developing countries are
interested in developing and would like to attract inward FDI. Triad based MNEs continue to
dominate such sectors, and although such firms do engage in value-added activities in
developing countries, they tend to concentrate these in a few locations where the appropriate
infrastructure and created assets are available. The failure of the majority of the stage 1 and 2
countries to create the kinds of assets - especially intellectual capital, organisational capability
and infrastructure facilities- which MNEs need to complement their own O advantages,
underlies the limited extent to which affiliates in these countries have been involved in the
process of rationalisation.
Reduced transaction costs due to ICTs has had a much more limited effect on the L
advantages of the least developed countries. Much of the FDI in stage 1 countries tends to be
natural resource-seeking.  These sectors have not benefited greatly from reductions in cross-
border transaction costs due to ICTs. Nonetheless, there are some such benefits. First,18
information about policies, incentives and procedures are much more widely disseminated.
Second, they are better able to coordinate activities within their countries (between, say,
regions that are competing for investment) and between various arms of policy makers and
agencies through one-stop shopping (Wells and Wint 1993).
The truncation of life cycles has meant that developing countries that have made
investments in certain specific types of created assets may not achieve a realistic return on
their high fixed costs by the time (or if) the technology becomes obsolete. Furthermore,
shifting to a new technological paradigm takes time, as country-specific changes must be
made at all levels, from macro-organisational policy to educational curricula, and such high
fixed costs may not represent an option for developing countries.
Renaissance of Market-Based Capitalism and Economic Liberalisation
The 1980s were a decade of considerable ideological and economic upheaval. In particular,
mention might be made of three interconnected events.  First, the cold war ended. Since 1989
more than 30 countries have abandoned central planning as the main mode of allocating
scarce resources. Second, over 80 developing countries have liberalised their economic
policies from inward looking, import-substituting regimes towards outward looking, export-
oriented policy regimes. Between them, these two developments have led to a softening of
attitudes of national governments towards inward FDI, the privatisation of state owned
enterprises, and the reduction of structural market distortions. MNEs are now actively
involved in, and have access to, an unprecedented number of countries. This trend is a
continuing one that has deepened during the 1990s.
Third, there has been an across-the-board liberalisation of cross-border markets due to
(i) (supra-national) regional and inter-regional free trade agreements and protocols, e.g., the
establishment of the basis for the European single market, NAFTA and MERCOSUR
13, (ii) a
range of bilateral arrangements; and (iii) the establishment of new multilateral agencies such
as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the further reduction of trade-related barriers as
contained in the Uruguay round of GATT.  As a consequence, all forms of trade have
markedly increased over the last decade. In addition, increasing attention is now being given
to the setting up of a multilateral framework which will ensure a liberalised environment for
the flow of FDI and for other forms of MNE activity.
(a) Liberalisation and O advantages
Table 3 presents a bullet list of the main benefits which MNEs have gained from
economic liberalisation. Privatisation, in particular, has allowed MNEs to acquire, in one fell19
swoop, fully-operational (albeit often inefficient) firms in countries at relatively low cost, due
inter alia to depreciation of exchange rates of the recipient economies
14. Since the Uruguay
Round, average tariffs and non tariff barriers have fallen considerably, and affiliates of MNEs
are increasingly accorded national treatment.
In addition, liberalisation, and the establishment of WTO and new protocols on
intellectual property rights, have improved the appropriability of intangible assets of MNEs.
They have, inter alia, also improved the ability of MNEs to undertake and enforce more arms-
length, non-equity type agreements.
(b) Liberalisation and L advantages
Although the effects of liberalisation are easily observed, some of which are outlined
in Table 4, the news is not as good for stage 1 and 2 economies, as it is for industrial and
converging countries. The increased competition between countries and regions to attract
mobile investment has increased significantly. While the level of worldwide outward FDI
stocks has also increased, a growing proportion of new investment flows is of an technology
intensive and knowledge augmenting kind, and/or requires the use of complementary
immobile assets. It therefore tends to be directed to the technologically more advanced
developed and developing countries. Because of the widespread liberalisation of foreign
investment regimes, there is now a much larger (possibly twice as many as two decades
previously) pool of countries offering ‘generic’ location-specific advantages such as access to
natural assets and basic infrastructure. The problem of too many countries chasing too little
FDI is exacerbated by the competition between provinces and regions within countries which
offer their own set of incentives (Mytelka 1996). National and sub-national governments are
therefore under pressure to offer ever increasing investment incentives in order to attract the
kind of FDI that they perceive will advance their development strategies. Furthermore,
inflows from privatisation often represent a single, one-off phenomenon – in the sense that
such inflows may initially generate a large initial infusion of capital, but nothing more.
Indeed, because MNEs intend to generate some rents from these investments, the net inflows
can be expected to be significantly smaller in subsequent years.
It is important to realise that the process of liberalisation is increasingly becoming an
exogenous event, over which developing country governments have less and less control. We
elucidate. First, the opening up or liberalisation of any particular market in a country
represents an endogenous event. However, the benefit that accrues to the country from this
event is a function of how many other countries have also liberalised. Second, membership of
supra-national institutions such as the WTO (as well as free trade areas, and other forms of20
economic integration) oblige the participating countries to conform their liberalisation
policies to a common standard. Third, membership of a de facto trade and investment blocs
can effect a change in policy, since, with increasingly few countries still operating within a
command economy or a import-substituting regime, there are few opportunities for such
countries to engage in economically sound non-market arrangements.
This erosion of the kind of L advantages associated with protected trade and
investment regimes is having far reaching consequences. Although the benefits of
liberalisation in terms of encouraging inward FDI are notable, some MNEs have divested in
response to liberalisation where the initial MNE activity has been to overcome tariff and non-
tariff. Since the conclusion of NAFTA, for example, defensive import substitution FDI in
Canada has fallen sharply. Although information on divestment in developing countries has
not been systematically collected, it is likely that, since proportionally more FDI prior to
liberalisation was defensive market seeking, this phenomenon might be a significant one.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Globalisation has fundamentally changed economic realities. One of the primary
effects of this has been a reconfiguration of countries into three groups: the least developed
countries which have 'fallen-behind', the catching up developing countries, and the developed
or 'converged' countries.  The process whereby this has happened is a complex one, and in this
paper we have outlined the dynamics behind these developments and what it has meant for the
relationship between MNEs and developing host country governments, and particularly to the
'falling behind' countries. Prior to this dichotomy of developing countries, a general approach
towards understanding the bargaining relationship between countries and MNEs was much
more feasible, and even practical. This, we argue, is no longer the case. We explain how
changes in L and O advantages due to globalisation have influenced the nature and context of
MNE-government relations, and why a distinction can and should be made between groups of
countries.
Over the last two decades, the opportunity costs of FDI for both host country
governments and MNEs has changed. From a MNE perspective, the twin forces of
globalisation- new technological developments and liberalisation- have considerably
influenced the nature and composition of the core competences of firms. These competences
are becoming increasingly mobile, firm-specific and knowledge-intensive. At the same time,
MNEs are increasingly seeking to consolidate or advance their global competitive positions,
by rationalising their cross-border value-added activities. Inter alia, this is shown by the21
continuing rise in intra-firm trade within MNE systems (UNCTAD 1997). This has been
helped, in no small measure, by the reduction in their cross-border transaction and
coordination costs due to trade and investment liberalisation.
In the pursuance of these objectives, MNEs - and particularly within the knowledge
intensive sectors - are being forced to give more attention to the availability and quality of the
largely L-specific created assets of alternative investment sites. It is important to note that not
all industries have become equally mobile or globalised. As Stopford (1997) notes, while the
optimum size of production may have risen in some industries, making global integration
desirable, in other cases, new technologies have reduced the minimum efficient scale.  This
has meant that MNEs (particularly in industries where external economies through spatial
linkages are critical) can become more embedded in local and regional milieus than was
previously the case, and, in consequence, they become less mobile.
From a national government perspective, exogenous and endogenous changes in the
global economic and political environment have caused a reappraisal of the benefits of
openness. Inter alia, this has meant that many developing countries have made a complete
volte face in their attitudes and policies towards MNE activity. To some extent, this represents
an ideological shift from the traditional inward-looking import-substituting model adopted by
many developing countries, where state was perceived to be the primary force behind the
creation, utilisation and dissemination of knowledge (Frischtak 1997). At the same time,
although the change in policy orientation and the subsequent privatisation of state-owned
enterprises has reduced the interventionist role of governments, that of the market facilitating
role and the provider of complementary created asset-based location-specific advantages has
become more critical (Dunning 1997b, Stopford 1997).
All these changes, however, still do not disguise the fact that national governments
and MNEs continue to have different goals. While in general, MNEs are more single-minded
and homogenous in their objectives, governments are much more varied in their expectations.
The twin goals most host governments seem to have in common are improving capital inflows
and development of indigenous know-how. Although these two objectives are not necessarily
incompatible, there may in fact be a trade-off between the two.
There is, nonetheless, a much closer alignment in the goals of MNEs and governments
in the current world scenario
15. Although the bargaining position continues to favour the
MNE, as far as the developing countries are concerned, and in the least developed countries,
increasingly so, the common ground is much greater.22
 In addition, globalisation, in as much as it has helped improve cross-border intra-firm
coordination of selected activities, this has meant that firm-specific resources and capabilities
are more footloose than was previously the case. That notwithstanding, MNEs are aware of
the costs of being footloose, particularly so because the improvement of their competitive
advantages increasingly depends on augmenting their often-customised firm-specific assets
with largely-immobile country-specific assets . The way to do this is through investing over a
long term in the synergies that they can derive from immobile assets of the host countries-
including those from agglomerative economies. In some senses, it can be said that the primary
disagreement that remains in the MNE-government relationship is one of how to distribute the
rents resulting from MNE activity, both in the short and long run.  That is to say, the rent
arising from innovatory and restructuring activities of MNEs ought to be considered alongside
that arising from improved 'static' allocative efficiency.
Governments are modifying their efforts to attract inbound investment in two major
respects. The first is to step up, or offer a new range of financial incentives. This is the route
favoured by national and sub-national governments. However, recent research by Mudambi
(1995) suggests that while incentives offered in isolation of other L advantages are not
effective, the longer they persist, the more likely that they will have a positive effect.  At the
same time, there is a danger that due to the increased competition, governments may give
away more than the potential benefits that accrue from the MNE activity (Mytelka 1996,
McIntyre, et al 1996).  This is all the more so, since governments of developing countries (or
regions within these countries) must compete with backward regions in industrialised
countries and with those of the former centrally planned economies whose infrastructure tends
to be far superior, and pockets far deeper than most developing countries. Given the costs
associated with offering incentives, and the profusion of locations offering incentives there is
a danger, that in an attempt to attract new ‘desirable’ investors, the net benefits to countries
are negative, and worse, the new investors may be treated preferentially relative to existing
(and embedded) firms (Mudambi 1998). Given the limited resources of developing countries,
this does not represent a viable or desirable long-term option.
The second means, that of identifying and offering unique and non-imitable immobile
assets to attract mobile investment is a better long-term solution. To offer the kinds of
advantages (e.g., in respect of education and transportation infrastructure) made available by
competitive governments is not sufficient; what is needed is the provision of immobile created
assets which are ‘custom made’ to the incoming investors (Peck 1996), or are specific to the
country and region seeking the investment (Dunning 1998). Often such assets are23
complementary to each other and need to be spatially clustered if they are to be deployed with
optimum efficiency (Storper and Scott 1995). In pursuance of this kind of strategy national
governments such as Singapore and Ireland and sub-national governments, e.g., Wales,
Northern Ireland, Shanghai, Bangalore, New South Wales, Baden-Wurttenburg and
Piedmont- to name just a few- have met with a great deal of success.
The challenge to national governments lies in providing the ‘right’ kind of immobile
assets, and to encourage mobile investments to be locked into these assets, and, in this, there
is little difference between the cases of developing, industrialising or industrialised
economies. It should be said, however, that for countries in stage 1 and stage 2, the question is
much more urgent, since there is a threshold level which is required to attract even the most
basic forms of FDI. In addition, though, if externalities are to accrue from FDI, these are most
likely associated with investments which are not only market or efficiency-seeking but which
in order to prosper, need to be spatially linked to complementary activities.  The idea of
enclaves such as EPZs, once quite popular as a means to attract FDI, have had mixed success
mainly because their planners often lost sight of the order in which events should have taken
place: the development of clusters of economic activity, from which might come welfare
benefits, rather than vice-versa. The limited nature of the L advantages offered to MNEs, and
the high costs of establishing these zones in remote areas where the necessary support
industries were present underlay their failure.
The basic idea of building enclaves is a sound one. After all, developing countries
have limited resources to plough into created asset-enhancement, and must therefore pick a
few locations to upgrade, just as several countries have targeted selected industries to nurture.
The use of FDI as a means to transfer technology is efficient only as long as sufficient
absorptive capability of the technologies exists locally (Borensztein et al 1998). Once
countries have progressed beyond the threshold in terms of their L-specific advantages, the
gradual building up of high grade centres and the development of clusters of economic
activity becomes a high priority. This is a task that is fraught with pitfalls, not least because
selecting the ‘right’ industry to target becomes more difficult the closer the country is to the
technological frontier. When governments attempt to select preferred industries in which to
focus some distance away from the technological frontier (say in differentiated Smithian
sectors – see Table 1), the direction in which investment is to be made is obvious since firms
at the frontier (i.e., the technology leaders) have already done so
16 in the past (Narula and
Dunning 1998).  That is to say, the further a country is from the technological frontier, the
easier it is to ‘pick’ industries that will be successful.  The relative success of MITI in picking24
winners in the 1950s and 1960s, and their subsequent less successful interventions in the
1980s and 1990s well illustrates this point. Although there is a danger in investing limited
resources in niche sectors which become obsolete, or get replaced by a new technological
paradigm, this need not happen if broader sectors are targeted that are complementary to, and
help upgrade, existing competencies and skills. The development of Singapore’s
biotechnology sector illustrates this well (Lall 1997). As Stopford (1997, pg. 473) explains,
“To nurture clusters, work needs to be done to identify specific technologies that can
reinforce the position of existing leaders, or that suit the skills of the workforce or even that
satisfy the demand that is particularly sophisticated in the nation. Investment in ‘market-friendly’
aspects of the underlying technologies can, as in Singapore, create a vital base for the building of
firm-specific advantages by either local or foreign firms.”
On the other hand, in this era of globalised production, it is easier to create clusters
from scratch, compared to the traditional view of industrial districts, where all aspects of the
value-added chain had to be catered for (Stopford 1997). Because of the abilities of MNEs to
locate different parts of their value-added chain in several locations to achieve global
efficiency, there is an increased opportunity for specialisation, and to attract MNEs to invest
in a niche area.  A complementary approach to improving L advantages is to engage in some
form of economic integration on a regional basis. However, as Baldwin (1997) notes, most
regional trade blocs and other forms of economic integration among developing countries
have remained very much a matter of organisation rather than substance (APEC, ASEAN),
with a few exceptions (e.g., MERCOSUR).
It is clear that a myriad of approaches to industrial policy have been taken by
developing countries to achieve catch-up, but since the economic structure of each country is
very path-dependent and idiosyncratic, it is difficult to suggest any one ‘best’ solution. Given
the stakes involved, and the pressures on developing countries to develop unique location-
specific advantages to attract the kind of FDI they need to upgrade their indigenous resources,
some sort of interventionist approach seems to be necessary. No self-evident solution exists,
because the changing world economic environment makes some of these options impractical,
or invalid for particular countries at particular stages of their IDP. For instance, the level of
infant industry protection undertaken by Japan or Korea during the early stages of their
development is now more difficult to implement, as the level of subsidies that governments
can legally provide are now restricted due to multilateral restrictions introduced within the
WTO framework.25
It cannot be emphasised too strongly that the means by which countries can develop
and maintain strong clusters of economic activity are not well-understood, despite
considerable research having been conducted, dating back to Marshall’s work on industrial
districts
17. The nature of globalisation adds yet another complication. For instance, financial
subsidies by governments to MNEs, especially those that have geocentric structures or who
have simply rationalised their activities to seek global efficiency are able to utilise resources
provided by one location in another, thereby defeating the objectives of governments.
The creation of centres of agglomeration is a difficult thing to achieve. Indeed, a
recent study by Head et al (1994) indicates that agglomeration is determined less by
differences in natural resources, labour and infrastructure, but by the presence of other firms.
Nonetheless, the presence of a certain minimum level of location-specific advantages
(infrastructure and skilled labour) must be necessary as a catalyst to attract these firms to
establish themselves in a given spatial area, and most importantly, the presence of domestic
firms with the technological capabilities to absorb the spillovers pertaining from the activities
of these firms. In addition though, it is clear that the use of incentives and subsidies is no
substitute for the presence of created assets, not just because of the inability to absorb
spillovers, but also because in locational tournaments involving richer countries, the least
developed countries are bound to lose.
                                                
1 These features are described in various publications, including UNCTAD (1997), Perraton et al (1997) and
OECD (1997).
2 Notably all kinds of knowledge, organisational and institutional capital.
3 Dunning (1993) charts the evolution of MNE-government interaction over a 30 year period, and in so doing
demonstrates the way in which economic forces are influenced by, and influence, the nature of government-
MNE relationships.
4 Where the inbound FDI stock as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 8.3% to 15.4% over
the same period (UNCTAD 1997).
5 The methodology proposed by Rugman and Verbeke (1998) focuses more on the strategic aspects of the
relationship.  It encompasses a broader analysis that provides the basis for a more dynamic approach, although it
is a general model in that it does not address either developing-country-specific issues, nor how the situation
varies between countries. Essentially this model argues that the relationship between MNE and governments is
determined inter alia by the degree of symmetry between inward and outward FDI in a given country, the
dispersion of firm-specific advantages within MNEs, the strategic approach by MNEs to government policy, and
the congruence between MNE and home and host country goals.  They include the net direct investment position
as a determinant, but do not consider the influence of the absolute levels.26
                                                                                                                                                        
6 See e.g., Dowrick and Gemmell (1991), Dowrick (1992), Verspagen (1992)
7 Africa and Latin America fell from 7.3% and 2.7% in 1980 to 5.5% and 0.8% in 1993 respectively (Dunning
and Narula 1998).
8 For further examples, see Nadvi and Schmitz (1994)
9 For instance, where the local market is large and the MNE can only get access to other sectors in exchange for
technology, or lucrative turn-key or other sub-contracts are included.
10 Some scholars believe ICTs are initiating a new technological paradigm (Freeman 1987, Freeman and Perez
1988).
11 Several recent UN studies (UN 1993, UNCTAD 1997) has indicated that there is an increasing number of
small and medium enterprises are engaging in FDI.
12 It can either: (a) sell at a relatively high cost per unit, and/or (b) develop a production process with a low
minimum efficient scale of production and/or (c) recoup its investment by acquiring a large market for its
products so as to spread its fixed costs, and/or (d) engage in an alliance with another firm (or firms) to speed up,
and share the costs of the innovatory process.
13 There are also non-binding agreements and protocols such as the OECD code of liberalisation of capital
movements (which are binding upon member states, but not on non-members) and guidelines for multinational
enterprises.
14 Over the period 1989-93, FDI from privatisation accounted for $12.2 billion or 7.6% of all inflows to
developing countries (UNCTAD 1996). Over 75% of this was directed towards Latin America and the
Caribbean, where privatisation accounted for 16.9% of all inflows to the region. In the case of Central and
Eastern Europe, FDI inflows to privatisation schemes amounted to $7.5 billion, or 59.7% of the total FDI inflows
to the region.
15 For a summary of the situation in the 1970s and early 1980s see Dunning (1993) and Wells (1998).
16 It is however necessary to emphasise the difference between firms that are a distance from the technology
frontier, and those that are simply experiencing X-inefficiency. The latter group are simply using an inferior
technology, while the former are operating at an earlier stage of the product life cycle.
17 For a review of the various strands of the literature, see Baptista (1998) as well as other contributions to
Swann et al (1998), and Enright (1994, 1998)27
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Figure 1: Host countries and MNEs: a static view of bargaining issues
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Figure 2: Changing bargaining positions between groups of countries
Changes in World Economic Environment due to globalisation
as a consequence of
1.  new technologies
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3.  emergence of new players on international scene
Advanced stage 2 and stage 3 countries







·  Well developed infrastructure.
·  Intermediate quality created assets.
·  Comparative disadvantage in natural assets.
·  Improving 'cluster' related opportunities.
Changes in the O advantages of
MNEs:
·  shift towards more efficiency  and
asset-seeking FDI
·  O advantages of firms more
mobile and knowledge-intensive.
·  Economies of scale sought due to
high fixed costs in knowledge
intensive sectors.
·   Networking and strategic
alliances have reduced need for
internalisation of markets.
·  new communication advances
have reduced cost of coordinating
cross-border activities.
Stage 1 and 2 countries
Have not fully developed
created-asset L advantages
FDI received either resource-
seeking or market seeking.
L characteristics
·  Abundant natural assets.
·  Rudimentary
infrastructure.
·  Limited or no domestic
industry.
·  Support sectors
undeveloped.
·  Few indigenous clusters
of related activities.








assets; and availability of
clusters of related activities.
Locational opportunities have
widened for market- and
efficiency- seeking FDI; this has
led to increased bargaining
power of MNEs.
Changes in the L advantages of countries
Globalisation has affected the l advantages
different countries differently. Increasing
heterogeneity of countries, in response to
economic divergence and disparity in
upgrading created assets34



























As for stage 4, but
fluctuating net zero


































Efficiency seeking FDI, market-seeking FDI
and asset-augmenting FDI
Table 1: the primary relationships underlying the investment development path













1980 1995 1995/1980 1980 1995 1995/1980
Low income countries (n=42)
mean 435.2 357.4 0.8 1.4 4.9 3.6
SD 320.1 163.9 1.7 6.1
Low-middle income countries (n=36)
mean 1219.1 1818.3 1.5 10.4 37.4 3.6
SD 618.7 720.3 12.2 39.3
Upper-middle income countries (n=20)
mean 3898.3 5340.2 1.4 40.4 179.5 4.4
SD 3576.6 1813.6 33.5 182.7
High income countries (n=32)
mean 11780.3 22081.8 1.9 353.7 1520.9 4.3
SD 7254.5 8381.4 1643.9 6777.0
Ratio of high income countries FDI pc to that of low income countries.
259.0 307.5
Ratio of high income countries FDI pc to that of low-middle income countries.
34.0 40.7
Ratio of high income countries FDI pc to that of upper middle income countries.
8.8 8.5
Sources:  GDP and population based on World Development Indicators CD-ROM, World Bank 1997
Inward FDI stock based on UN (1997)
Notes: all countries for which GDP was unavailable for 1980 and 1995 (or close proxy) were excluded. 
this excludes all former soviet bloc countries, but includes Vietnam and China
Countries were classified according to World Bank criteria for 1995: low income <$765 GDP per capita
Low-middle income, $766-3035, upper-middle income, 3036-9385, high income: >$9386 
Table 2: Changes in GDP and inward FDI stock per capita,1980 and 1992: evidence of divergence 
GDP per capita Inward FDI stock per capita36
Triad-based MNEs





Liberalisation Growing use of efficiency
seeking investment, as MNEs
locate to better exploit
economies of scale and scope.
More options for location of
labour and resource intensive
investment because of DC
liberalisation.
Limited or no change in options
for knowledge-intensive
sectors, and for asset-
augmenting activities.






























































Improved access to information
leads to more efficient choice
of location.
Need to be in closer proximity
of related industries to reduce
spatial transaction costs
truncated product life
cycles, need for multi-
technology competencies















in more optimal intra-
firm coordination, and
integration.
Table 3: the changing nature of the world economic environment and the opportunity sets of
MNEs
COUNTRIES




Natural assets Created assets
Liberalisation More alternatives in terms of
technology, as well as




Subsidy limits from WTO
membership reduces O












New technologies Opportunity for leapfrogging-
smaller stock of knowledge.
Improved ability to find
alternatives due to ICTs
More inter-country and inter-
region competition on
incentive schemes.
Easier for firms to transfer
price due to ICTs, and reduce
tax burden.
Truncated life cycles mean
that L advantages may
become obsolete.  High





Table 4: the changing nature of the world economic environment and the opportunity sets of
host countries